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NOTES
THE USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS IN STATUTORY .INTERPRETATION IN KENTUCKY
The purpose of all statutory interpretation is to discover
the purpose or intent of the legislative body in exacting the
statute.1 To aid the courts in arriving at the intention of the
legislature the various canons of statutory interpretation
have been formulated to make such interpretation to some degree
mechanical or at least predictable. The great increase m the
amount of legislation necessary to govern complicated modern
civilization has caused the federal courts, and to a lesser extent
the state courts, to abandon their rigid adherence to the "plain
meaning rule" and other canons of construction 2 which are
often the subterfuges behind which they conceal much judicial
legislation, 3 and to resort to many extrinsic aids in their attempt
to arrive at the intention of the legislature. 4 The purpose of this
note is to consider briefly the extent to which the Kentuckv
Court of Appeals has gone in the use of extrinsic aids in its
interpretation of statutes, with particular emphasis on the legislative journals.
The "intention of the legislature" has been condemned as a
mere fiction,5 but has also been defended or accepted as a necessary and helpful aid in statutory construction by leading writers
in the field in recent years.0 It is not within the scope of this
'Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule.and Extrinsic Aids -inthe Interpretation of Federal Statutes (1939) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 2; Landis,
A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 886.
'Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention (1940) 40
COL. L. REV. 957, 959.

'Note (1937) 50 HAnv. L. REv. 822.
'de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in Interpretationof Statutes (1940)
88 U. OF PA. L. R. 527.
rRadin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 l~Hv. L. REv. 863;
see also: Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established
by Extrinsic Evidence (1940) 20 B. U. L. REv. 601.
'Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 HAhv.
L. Ruv. 886; Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention (1932) 38
W VA. L. Q. 119; Jones, Extrnmc Aids in The Federal Courts (1940)
25 IowA L. REv. 737" Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic
Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes (1939) 25 WASH.
U. L. Q. 2.
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note to attempt an analysis of "legislative intention," but
merely to accept the term as it seems to be used by the Kentucky
Court. Since neither the debates by the members of the legislature nor the reports of the proceedings before the committees of
the legislature are preserved in this state, 7 the phrase "the intention of the legislature," as used by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, must of necessity refer to legislative "purpose" as
distinguished from legislative "meaning. '"s That is, the court
can not enter into speculation as to what an individual legislator,
the statutory draftsman, or the legislature as a body actually
meant by the words employed, because this would place statutory interpretation in a field with theology and literary criticism, as has been aptly pointed out,9 but must confine itself to
ascertaining the "purpose" for which the legislature enacted
the statute.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has stated on many occasions that it will refer to extrinsic aids in interpreting statutes
when the 'intention of the legislature can not be readily ascertained from the words of the statute, when parts of the same
statute are inconsistent, when the statute under consideration
conflicts with other statutes, or when some other ambiguity or
conflict exists.' 0 The court has been very willing to find such an
ambiguity or conflict as would allow it to invoke extrinsic aids.'I
Prominent among the aids invoked are the legislative history of
the act under consideration as indicated by the journals of the
houses of the General Assembly ;12 the contemporary history of
The Kentucky Constitution of 1890 sec. 40 requires only that
each house of the General Assembly keep a journal of its proceedings and the vote by yeas and nays on any measure may be recorded
therein at the request of two members. See Sections 46, 55, 88, 112,
256, aid 258 relative to other entries in the journals.
'Jones, Extrinsic Aids in Federal Courts (1940) 25 IowA L. REV.
737, 761, Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes (1939) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 2, 3-4;
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV.
886, 9888.
Radin, op. cit. supra note 5, at 866-868.
"Swift v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 294 Ky. 137, 171 S.W
2d 49 (1943) Williams v. City of Raceland, 245 Ky 212, 53 S.W 2d
370 (1932), City of Vanceburg v. Plummer, 275 Ky. 713, 122 S.W 2d
772 (1938).
"Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky 112, 171 S.W
2d 41 (1943).
"May v. Clay-Gentry-Graves Warehouse Co., 284 Ky. 502, 145
S.W 2d 84 (1940).

-
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the act as to the evil to be remedied by it ;13 the history of the
statute through its various revisions through the years ;14 con" temporary construction of the statute by the courts,' 5 by admnstrative agencies,1 6 by the executive, 17 and by the legislature ;18 the debates of the constitutional conventions;19 and the
title of the act being construed.2 0 The use of the titles of acts
and statutes as an aid in interpreting the statutes is an interesting and special field, especially in connection -with section 51 of
the Kentucky Constitution of 1890,21 and should be treated in
a separate note, therefore it will not be discussed here.
When the court has decided that there exists such an ambiguity or conflict as will require it to use extrinsic aid there
seems to be an almost complete abandonment of any inhibitions
against their use, and all phases of the contemporary history of
the statute will be considered. As pointed out in Morgan v The
Fayette County Board of Education:22 "The vnmnediate occasion
or specific purpose of legislation is not always controlling in
interpretation of a statute,
" In that case the court traced
the history of the Public Works Administration and indicated
that it had been necessary for the legislature to pass the statute
being construed and other legislation in order to allow educational institutions to take advantage of the opportuities offered
under this federal act. On other occasions the court has similarly
traced the history, of the Federal Social Security Act;23 considered a report to the Governor on the banulupt condition of
"Martin v Louisville Motors, 276 Ky 696, 125 S.W 2d 241
(1939).
'4 Trustees of Baptist Female College of Liberty Assn. v. Barren
County Board of Education, 190 Ky. 565, 228 S.W 19 (1921).
1 Coleman v. Green, 239 Ky 580, 40 S.W 2d 283 (1931)
1
Harned v. Atlas Powder Co., 301 Ky. 517, 192 S.W 2d 378
(1946)
'5See: Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v Barbour, 8 Ky. L. Rep.
436 (1866)
'5Button v. Hikes, 296 Ky. 163, 176 S.W 2d 112 (1943).
Commonwealth v International Harvester Company of
America, 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W 703 (1909).
'Neutzel v. Ryan, 184 Ky. 292, 211 S.W 852 (1919).
'Section
51 of the Constitution of Kentucky provides that no
law enacted shall refer to more than one sub3ect and that shall be
expressed m the title.
'5294 Ky 597, 600, 172 S.W 2d 64, 66 (1943).
'5Barnes v. Anderson National Bank, 293 Ky 592, 169 S.W 2d
833 (1943)
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the State in construing a tax measure ;24 considered the economic
state of the nation ;25 and considered slum clearance and public
health 20 in its attempt to discover the evil which the legislature
was attempting to remedy
The most interesting phase of the problem under consiaeration is the use of the legislative journals, debates of the constitutional conventions and other legislative records in the construction of statutes. The failure of the state courts generally to resort
more frequently to legislative journals in interpreting statutes
is due primarily to the inadequacy of the records of legislative
proceedings kept by the states. 2" The Federal Courts, with the
full and complete Congressional R~ecord, have gone much further
than the state courts in the use of such records.28 Kentucky does
not publish committee reports nor the debates and remarks of
the members of the legislature on the floor or in committee
hearings. The House and Senate Journals in Kentucky, however,
do have one advantage not found in most state legislative journals in that the text of each bill and amendment is set out in
full. 2 9 But as is the case with the legislative journals in most
states the journals of the Kentucky General Assembly are made
up principally of the minutes of routine legislative action and
memorials to former officials.
The extent of the reliance placed on such records by the
court is not clear. When it seems necessary that the legislative
history of an act be considered the court does not hesitate to
refer to the journals to show that an amendment was considered
and rejected or accepted as proof that the legislature considered
a certain situation and intended the statute to apply or not to
apply to it. An outstanding example of the court's drawing
inferences from the acceptance and rejection of amendments as
indicative of legislative intent is found in City of Covzngton v
'Martin v. Louisville Motors, 276 Ky. 696, 125 S.W 2d 241
(1939).
'Grieb v. National Bank of Kentucky's Receiver, 252 Ky 753,
68 S.W 2d 21 (1934).
1 Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky 97, 103 S.W 2d 651 (1937).
- Jones, Extrinsic Aids -n the "FederalCourts (1940) 25 IowA L.
REv. 737.

Ibid.
Bradley, Legislative Recording in the United States (1935) 29
AM. POL. Sc. REv. 74, 77, n. 6.
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State Tax Conmsswn.30 Here the plaintiff city, and the intervening charitable and educational institutions and retail merchants seek a declaration of their rights under the state sales tax
act. Issues were raised as to whether eleemosynary institutions
were exempt from the payment of the tax and whether the tax
should be paid by the buyer or by the seller. After developing
sthe legislative history of the act the court stated.
"Applying it [the rule that the history of the statute

and the proceedings attending its actual passage through
the legislature as disclosed by the legislative journals
may be considered m construing ambiguous statutes]
in this case, we find it is admitted in the briefs, and
shown by the journals of the two Houses of the General
Assembly, that the Statute when first introduced was
essentially one imposing the tax levied by it on the
the act was amended in sevmerchant or seller,
eral particulars, prominent among which was a shifting of the burden of paying the tax from the merchant
or seller to the consumer or buyer, and which was
accomplished by the amendatory provisions we have
hereinbefore discussed."
In May v Clay-Gentry-Graves Warehouse Co.3 i the court
considered the journals of the House and Senate at some length
and ascertained the intention of the legislature from the inferences to be drawn from the adoption of amendments by the
Senate and the subsequent approval of these amendments in the
House. This case is an excellent illustration of the employment of
extrinsic aids by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in their search
for the intention of the legislature. The court in arriving at its
interpretation considered the contemporary history of the business affected (here tobacco warehousing), the title of the act,
the House Journal, the Senate Journal, and the remarks made by
the Governor upon his approval of the bill. This clearly indicates
that the court is not averse to the use of adequate extrinsic aids
to assist in ascertaining the legislative intent on the proper
occasions.
But in Fiscal Court of Fayette Coulnty v. Nichols 32 the
court was considering an act relative to the rights of the fiscal
court, the county judge, and the county road engineer to employ
men to work on the county roads and reference was made to the
House and Senate journals to show the bill as originally intro' 257 Ky 84, 91, 77 S.W 2d 386, 389-390 (1934).
31284 Ky. 502, 145 S.W 2d 84 (1940).
-287 Ky. 478, 153 S.W 2d 986 (1941).
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duced. For some unexplained reason the bill as it was reported
to the House after passing the Senate had been altered and the
House had rejected an amendment winch covered the situation
under consideration. The court considered the journals in so far
as it was justified considering the incompleteness of the records.
The unexplained alteration of the bill after its passage by the
Senate and before its presentation in the House as disclosed by
the journals serves to accentuate the inadequacy of the legislative records of tis state and the court in tis case seems justified in stating, "We must construe the statute as enacted, enrolled and signed by the presiding officers of the Legislature
and approved by the Governor, and seek the Legislature's intention there. We can not go behind it though the records of
the journals be to the contrary " In City of Vanceburg v
Plurnne, 33 the Court was required to determine whether or not
a muicipal corporation was required to obtain a certificate of
necessity and convemence from the Public Service Commission
in order to operate an electric power plant under Chapter 145
of the 1934 Acts of the General Assembly The House Journal
was introduced to show that an amendment was offered to the
act wluch specifically provided that cities must obtain a certificate of necessity and convemence in order to operate an electric
power plant and that this amendment was rejected. It was
argued that this definitely indicated that it was the intention of
the legislature that municipal corporations were not to be af
fected by the requirements of the act. But the Court found that
the act did require cities to secure a certificate of necessity and
convenience stating
"The rejection of the amendment is entitled to little
weight, since the court can have no means of knowing
the reasons that influenced the legislature in such reRejection by the legislature of a proposed
jection
amendment to an act is, at most, only a circumstance to
be weighed along with others when choice is nicely
The journals of the legislature may not
balanced
be resorted to for the purpose of supporting a construc-

tion which adds to or takes from the significance of the
words employed." '

-275 Ky. 713, 122 S.W 2d 772 (1938).
'But the court also said: "Where the language of a statute is

doubtful or ambiguous, resort may be had to the journals or to the
legislative records showing the legislative hustory of the act in ques-
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The cases above cited are definitely inconsistent and represent the two lines of thought by the Court, one accepting the
journals as a valuable aid in determining the intention of the
legislature, the other rejecting the journals as incomplete, inadequate, and of little, if any, value to the Court. The latter
view may be attribuited in part to a feeling by the Court that
the records are not sufficiently complete to render assistance to
the Court in ascertaining the legislative intent, rather than a
rejection by the Court of this type of evidence.
The probative value which the Court gives to the legislative
journals is well indicated by a series of cases not involving the
interpretation of statutes, but involving the constitutionality of
a statute when attacked for the failure to observe some formal
step required by the Constitution in the process of enactment.
The leading case in this series is Lafferty v Huffmaa 35 where
the validity of a local option act was attacked for the failure of
the Senate on final passage of the act, after it had been amended
by the House, to vote by yea and nay and to record the vote in
the journal as required by the Constitution, section 46. The
Senate Journal indicated that section 46 had not been complied
with, but the act had been enrolled and signed by the presiding
officer of each house of the legislature and by the Governor.
In holding that the act was a valid law and could not be impeached by the Senate Journal the Court went at great length
into th.e method in which the legislative journals are made up. "
tion in order to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, but this
rule does not apply where the language is plain and unambiguous."
275 Ky. 713, 721, 122 S.W 2d 772, 776 (1938).
' 99 Ky. 80, 35 S.W 123, 18 K.L.R. 17 (1896).
'The
court commented on the records as follows: "The enrolled bill, so attested and signed, and approved by the Executive is
easy of access and inspection; but what shall we say of the journals?
At the session at which the law under consideration was adopted,
those records consist of over 4,000 pages. They seem to have been
hurriedly and imperfectly indexed, as in the nature of things they
This is usually prepared by the subordinate officials,
must be
hurriedly amidst the excitement and confusion incident to legislative bodies, and with small concern for those details winch are to

become so inportant if the record is to be subjected to judicial

but the chances of mistake are very great in the makescrutiny
up of the journals as they are ordinarily kept; and, if it be understood
that the enrolled bill may be impeached by them, the chances of
fraud are likewise great. They are usually read from loose sheets or
hurriedly made memoranda, and are approved with slight attention,
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The court reached the conclusion "that the consistent and
safe rule is to assume that the legislature, in obedience to the
constitution, has taken steps required by that instrument in
the passage of every law attested by the signatures of its presiding officers, the journals to the contrary notwithstanding."
The rule laid down in Lafferty v Huffman has been followed in several cases including Vogt v. Beauchamp3 7 where, it
is interesting to note, the Court held that a bill never approved
by the House of Representatives in any form, in fact rejected
by a 48 to 27 vote, became a law of this State regardless of the
action by the elected representatives of the people as shown by
8
the undisputed record of the House Journal.3
There are cases which have varied somewhat the rule of
Lafferty v Huffran and allowed the journals to be received
as evidence of the validity of an act. In Perkuns v Lucas 39 it
was held th.at when the Constitution required that a bill vetoed
by the Governor but passed over Ins veto is reconsidered by
the legislature the vote by year and nays must be taken and
the result recorded in the journals, such journals must of
necessity be looked to and thereby become competent evidence.
In Mcintyre v Commonwealth4 the court considered the requirement of the Kentucky Constitution of 1890 that the cause
for any emergency clause in a bill be set out at length in the
journals. It was held that failure to comply with this requirement would invalidate an emergency clause. This would seem
to be contrary to the rule of Lafferty v Huffman in that the
journals were allowed to impeach a portion of a properly
and are then passed to the journal clerk or some copyist to be transcribed formally m the journal. They receive, usually, no further
consideration at the hands of the body." 99 Ky. 80, 88-90, 35 S.W
123, 125-126 (1896).
- 153 Ky 64, 154 S.W 393 (1913).
" In Hamlett v. McCreary 153 Ky. 755, 156 S.W 410 (1913),
the court held that where the Senate Journal showed that the President of the Senate had signed the bill but the face of the bill showed
he had not signed, the bill did not become a valid law Accord:
State Board of Charities and Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227
S.W 282 (1920), Duncan v. Combs, 131 Ky. 330, 115 S.W 222
(1909), Norman v. Kentucky Board of Managers of Worlds Columbian Exposition, 93 Ky 537, 20 S.W 901 (1892), Auditor v. Haycraft, 77 Ky. 284 (1878)
197 Ky. 1, 246 S.W 150 (1922).
221 Ky. 16, 297 S.W 931 (1927).
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signed and enrolled bill. Judge Dietzman wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion to this effect, criticizing the majority's statement that their opinion was not contra to Lafferty v

Huffman.
Further confusion as to just what probative value is
given to legislative journals results from the decision in
Gammack v Harris.4 1 A question arose here as to what time
the House .of Representatives adjourned on a certain day The
House Journal showed that the body adjourned at 2 p. m., but
'the uncontradicted testimony of witnesses showed that the
House in fact adjourned at 12:30 p. m. The Court held, "however, the record of the journal must, under a umversal rule,
be accepted. '2
While the cases just considered do not deal with the problem of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation, they do indicate the general attitude of the Court of Appeals towards
legislative journals.
The vigorous criticism of such records
in Lafferty v Huffman is justified, but the cases indicate
that when the journals sbhow facts which are of use to the
court, the court is not adverse to the use of such records and
seem to indicate that the court would give greater weight to
and make more extensive use of legislative journals if they
were more complete and more accurately kept. This fact is
emphasized by Kirkman v Williams 43 where the court was
asked to reconcile two inconsistent statutes passed at the same
session of the legislature. In ascertaining the intention of the
General Assembly in enacting the statutes the history of the
two acts was traced in detail from the journals but no ques4
tion as to their admissibility was raised.3
While it is a matter of pure conjecture as to what use in
the interpretation of statutes the Court of Appeals would
make of the debates in the General Assembly if such became
available, some indication of their attitude towards such evi" 234 Ky. 846, 29 S.W 2d 567 (1930).
'234 Ky. 846, 849, 29 S.W 2d 567, 569 (1930).
246 Ky. 481, 55 S.W 2d 365 (1932).
"See: City of Covington v. Ludlow, 58 Ky. 295 (1858) relative
to the admissibility of the journals of a city council to impeach a

city ordinance.
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dence nught be drawn from their use of the debates of the
Constitutional Convention of 1890 in construing the Constitution and statutes. In a case 45 shortly after the Constitutional
Convention of 1890 the court flatly rejected the record of the
debates as an aid in construing a constitutional provision,
stating
"We have examined with some care the debates of
the constitutional convention upon the subject of the
constitutional provision against trusts, pools, and combinations
the exammatiop has shown the wisdom of
the general rule, several times approved in Kentucky
that the debates of a legislative body have little practical value in ascertaining the meaning to be given to the
action of such bodies, and are of value chiefly insofar as
they show that the attention of the body was called to
the existence of facts which might influence its action
Obviously, a court will not pay the slightest attention to any such declaration in debate, but will be
guided in ascertaining the meaning of the instrument
by the language which was actually adopted to express
that meaning." I

But some twenty-five years later, in 1926, the court was
again asked to interpret a section of the Constitution in
Shanks, Auditor v. Jdian, Jr 4 The court quoted at some
length from the debates showing that several members of the
Convention had definite ideas about the section under consideration and had explained their vote on the measure to the
Convention. The court then made this statement, "In the light
of them [certain cited cases] and of the debate in the Convention on the adoption of this section as a part of our fundamental law, it is very clear that the purpose of section 249 was
[etc.]
Nothing that we could here say would serve to elucidate that purpose more clearly, tersely, or aptly than the debate in the Convention we have quoted.
,,4s While it is not
possible to say that this later case shows a definite trend
towards the use of debates in interpretation of the constitution
Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 57 S.W 471 (Ky. 1900).
'In Lafferty v. Huffman, 99 Ky. 80, 86, 35 S.W 123, 124, 18
K. L. R. 17 (1896) the court reflected its attitude in the statement:
"That the act or successive acts of some agency, somewhere or
somehow, must be held conclusive, is entirely evident, unless we
open the doors to all competent proof, including that of the member
on the floor, an absurdity not to be thought of."
4'213 Ky. 291, 280 S.W 1081 (1926).
213 Ky. 291, 300, 280 S.W 1081, 1084 (1926).
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or that the court would use the legislative debates to aid in
statutory interpretation if such were available, this case does
show that the court is not now adverse to the use of such debates and could furnish a precedent upon which the court
could base their use of legislative debates in ascertainmng the
intent of the legislature.
The Court of Appeals has from time to time invoked the
assistance of various aids not usually considered as extrinsic
aids to statutory interpretation. In Fidelity & Colwnrba Trust
Co. v Meek 49 the court allowed Hon. Robert K. Cullen.
Editor-in-Chief of the Kentucky Revsed Statutes and now
Reviser of Statutes to testify and to produce work sheets to
show that the omission of certain words in a section of the
statutes as revised was the result of a clerical error and that
it was not the intention of the legislature that this section be
changed. The message of the Governor upon the approval of
a bill was cited to aid in the construction of an ambiguous
statute in May v Clay-Gentry-Graves Warehouse Co.5 0 These
recent cases show that the Kentucky court, when it deems it
necessary, will use the most unconventional extrinsic aids
to support an interpretation of a statute which seems just.
It has been contended that all law is judge made. 1 It has
also been contended that the popular idea that the legislature
passes the laws and the courts interpret and apply them is
fallacious.5 2 While these propositions contain an element of
truth, the cases in Kentucky indicate a willingness on the part
of the Court to receive extrinsic evidence to aid in its determination of the purpose of a statute. Judicial legislation to
some degree is inevitable because of the inh.erent inability of
language to convey the intended meaning.
S294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W 2d 41 (1943).
S284 Ky. 502, 145 S.W 2d 84 (1940).
Radin, op. cit. supra 881. "But since a choice implies motives,
it is obvious that, somewhere, somehow, a judge is impelled to make
his selection-not quite freely, as we have seen, but within generous
limits as a rule-by those psychical elements which make him the
kind of person that he is. That this is pure subjectivism and therefore an unfortunate situation is beside the point."
See also: GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed.
1927) 170.
"WILLOUGHBY,
TnE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIc LAw
(1931) 72.

201
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The most logical means of reducing judicial legislation
to a minimum and thus carrying into execution the will of the
'people, as manifested by the action of the General Assembly,
would be to make available to the Court and to the public a
complete and accurate record of all the proceedings of the
state legislative bodies. If such records were available it is
believed that the Court of Appeals would follow the lead of
the United States Supreme Court and the other federal courts
and make use of legislative records far more extensively than
it has in the past. It would be a profitable investment by the
State to provide more complete legislative records to aid the
Court of Appeals m ascertaining the intention of the legislature in enacting the laws placed by it on the statute books.
WILLIAM H.

COLDIRON

